Agency and Musical Expression
(paper developed with Pieter-Jan Maes & Thomas Fritz)
The concept of agency refers to the sense of control
of one’s actions. From the viewpoint of dynamic cognition, this is conceived
in terms of anticipatory models that predict sensory outcomes of actions. A
match between the predicted outcome and the sensory inflow is seen as a marker
for agency. Fritz et al. (2013) show that musical agency, in a context of
strenuous activities, can dramatically reduce the perception of exertion. This
suggests that agency draws attention to musical states rather than body states.
To explain this, we argue that musical expression requires a degree of
spontaneity which can only be achieved by monitoring sensory inflow in real
time. Our assumption is that musical expression relies on
low-level automatic motor control adequate to the real-time matching of audio
effect to intended musical action. Note that even small variations in the
realization of these intentions would have a great impact on expressive
phrasing. This is comparable to speech prosody where emphasis on a singular phoneme
can change the meaning of a whole sentence. We assume that the perceived
reduction in physical exertion during this type of spontaneous motor control
is due to the process of combining low-level gestural patterns, motorically
already well established, into larger expressive gestures. The modulating
influence of this process of constant monitoring on perceived exertion may be
two-fold: 1. The task of combining the gestural building block in real-time
may demand so many attentional resources that fewer are devoted to bodily
exertion, 2. The use of automated gestural building blocks is achieved by a
non-deliberate (possibly emotional) system of motor control. This might entail
a survival related optimization of control that is perceived as less taxing. The
process of expressive gestural control may have its basis in social
communication and thus be most prominent during musical interactions. |